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THE CIVIL LITIGATOR
Colorado Rule of Evidence 502: Preserving
Privilege and Work Product Protection in Discovery
by Christopher B. Mueller, Ronald J. Hedges, and Lino S. Lipinsky
Colorado Rule ofEvidence 502 follows Federal Rule ofEvidence 502 in taking aflexible approach to determin-
ing whether a waiver ofthe attorney--client privilege or workproduct protection has occurred in civil and crimi-
nal actions. This article explores the main provisions ofthe rule.
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted Colorado Rule ofEvidence (CRE) 502 effective March 22, 2016. The newrule is basedon a si ilar provisi n added in 2008 to the
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) that takes a flexible approach to
the question whether disclosure in civil or criminal actions can result
in a waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product protection.
Fourteen other states have also adopted versions of FRE 502.1
Major Provisions of CRE 502
Briefly, the new rule contains five major provisions:
1. CRE 502(b) provides that inadvertent production does not
necessarily waive claims of attorney-client privilege or work
product protection. In this respect, the rule complements the
"clawback" provision in Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure
(CRCP) 26(b)(5)(B), adopted in 2014, which allows the pro-
ducing party to seek return of material disclosed inadvertently
and bars the receiving party from using or disclosing it until a
court can rule on the underlying issues. The clawback provi-
sion assumes that inadvertent disclosure doesn't necessarily
waive claims of privilege or work product, and CRE 502
adopts this principle in the form of a rule that is a statement
of positive law.
2. CRE 502(a) sets a standard for the extent of waiver of privi-
lege or work product protection: Intentional waiver extends to
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undisclosed material dealing with "the same subject matter" as
the disclosed material to the extent that the former "ought in
fairness" to be considered with what was disclosed. Inadvertent
disclosure-to the extent that it results in waiver at all-
extends only to what was actually disclosed. In other words,
broad subject matter waiver is discarded where disclosure is in-
advertent.
3. CRE 502(d) and (e) provide for court orders and party agree-
ments dealing with the effects of disclosure on claims of privi-
lege or work product protection. Under Rule 502(e), such agree-
ments and court orders are enforceable among the parties.
4. CRE 502(d) also provides that court orders (which typically
embody agreements reached by the parties) are enforceable in
other state or federal proceedings, which means that they are
enforceable not only against the parties in the proceeding that
generated the court order, but against nonsigning outside par-
ties in other proceedings as well.
5. CRE 502(c) addresses the effect in Colorado proceedings of
disclosures in other federal or state courts. It provides that dis-
closures in other state or federal courts that are not covered by a
court order do not waive privilege claims or work product pro-
tection in Colorado courts if those disclosures would not have
resulted in waiver had they occurred in a Colorado proceeding.
Both FRE 502 and CRE 502 are silent on what happens if
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disclosure occurs in proceedings in other courts that have
entered orders governing the matter. The framers of the fed-
eral provision thought that orders entered by state courts
would be honored by federal courts, as a matter of full faith
and credit, and that orders entered by federal courts would be
honored in other federal courts, as a matter of federal preclu-
sion law and full faith and credit if the order affected privilege
claims based on state law.2 Hence the federal framers thought
no rule was necessary for these situations, and CRE 502
reflects the same underlying view.
The following sections look more closely at these provisions.
Waiver by Inadvertent Production
Until late in the last century, giants such as Wigmore and
McCormick took the view that litigants disclosed at their peril.3
The prevailing attitude was that "privileges shut out the light" and
confer only "speculative benefits," so a kind of "absolute liability"
was appropriate.4 Disclosure meant that the claimant hadn't exer-
cised proper care, so protection was lost no matter how disclosure
occurred.
In the digital age, however, with increasingly complex litigation
and an explosion of electronically stored information, a strict waiver
rule no longer makes sense (arguably, it made no sense 50 years ago
either). Indeed, electronically stored information is such a common
phenomenon that it has acquired an acronym recognized every-
where-ESI. Anyone who writes a brief or article knows that it's
impossible to catch every typo, no matter how much time is spent
in the effort. In much modern litigation (in both civil and crimi-
nal cases) it's also impossible to catch every document embraced
by attorney-client privilege or work product protection.
Equally important, the cost of an exhaustive effort to conduct a
privilege and work product review is often vastly disproportional to
the risks: A great many documents that are privileged or work prod-
uct may also be inconsequential or of marginal utility, so disclosure
has little or no impact. But this is not always the case, which is why
it is critical to prevent inadvertent or accidental disclosure from hav-
ing serious consequences. Some documents reflect client statements
not known to the other side, and some reveal tactics or strategy that
would be embarrassing or damaging, even though these documents
reflect careful and responsible legal representation.
Even before the adoption of CRE 502, Colorado case law had
embraced the view that inadvertent production does not necessar-
ily waive attorney-client privilege. The salient authority is the
Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Floyd v. Coors Brewing Co.,s
which followed what the Court called the "modern trend." Floyd
endorsed consideration of the following factors in deciding
whether inadvertent production might result in waiver of attorney-
client privilege:
* the extent to which reasonable precautions were taken to pre-
vent the disclosure of privileged information;
* the number of inadvertent disclosures made in relation to the
total number of documents produced;
* the extent to which the disclosure, albeit inadvertent, has
caused such a lack of confidentiality that no meaningful
confidentiality can be restored;
* the extent to which the disclosing party has sought remedial
measures in a timely fashion; and
* considerations of fairness to both parties under the circum-
stances.6
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Extent of Waiver
Under FRE 502(a)(1) and (3), "intentional" disclosure waives
privilege or work product protection for material actually disclosed
and for other material that "ought in fairness to be considered"with
it. This provision aims to prevent selective disclosure for tactical
reasons that might distort the truth. But under FRE 502(b), "inad-
vertent" disclosure can waive privilege or work product protection
only for material actually disclosed. More important, under FRE
502(b)(2) and (3), such disclosure does not waive privilege or work
product protection at all if the disclosing party "took reasonable
steps" to prevent it and "promptly took reasonable steps to rectify
the error."
The challenge is to know what constitutes "reasonable steps,"
particularly before disclosure, where the question is whether the
disclosing party took reasonable steps to catch privileged material
and work product, but failed to do so and wound up inadvertently
disclosing it. Rhoads Industries v. Building Materials Corp.7 provides
the most extensive discussion of this matter. Citing the same five
factors stressed in Floyd, the federal court in Rhoads Industries con-
cluded that inadvertent production did not waive the plaintiff's
privilege claim, with the exception of some documents that were
withheld and not included on a privilege log (for these documents,
the court concluded that the privilege was waived). For the other
documents, the court held that inadvertent production did not
waive the privilege: The court stressed that the plaintiff put its in-
formation technology expert in charge, deployed special software,
and offered reasonable xplanations for the fact that some docu-
ments accidentally got through.9 In the end, the Rhoads court was
impressed that only 812 out of 78,000 documents produced were
privileged (1% of the total).10 The court, however, also criticized
the plaintiff for delays in preparing for production during discovery
in the case that it was initiating, and for delays in rectifying the
error in producing privileged documents." The decisive factor for
the court was the "interests ofjustice,"which led it to conclude that
the defendant had no right to expect access to privileged material
and that the privilege claim survived the plaintiff's missteps.12
Particularly where the parties have not agreed on a protocol for
culling out privileged material and work product, the risk of waiver
by disclosure remains significant. In contrast with Rhoads, a West
Virginia federal court in Justus v. Ethicon, Inc. found that the plain-
tiffwaived her privilege by disclosing a letter from her lawyer dur-
ing a court-ordered physical examination by a doctor.13 She sim-
ply handed the letter to the doctor's staff and "failed to take rea-
sonable precautions to prevent disclosure," having made no effort
"to limit the staff's access to the information contained in the let-
ter."14 It was not one of "thousands of documents" and the plain-
tiff was not "pressured to produce it," and it was not even labeled
as "privileged" or otherwise identified as an attorney-client com-
munication.15
But inadvertent production, even where it seems careless or ill-
advised, does not waive privilege or work product protection for
additional material dealing with the same general subject.6 Thus,
in GreenleafArms Realty Trust I, LLC v. New Boston Fund, Inc., a
Massachusetts court found that inclusion of an email from the
plaintiff's lawyer as an exhibit to a complaint did not waive a privi-
lege claim for other material in the files of the lawyer because the
point of the exhibit was to highlight an email from defense coun-
sel, so inclusion of the email from plaintiff's counsel was apparently
accidental.17 Although the lawyer "let the cat out of the bag," the
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court concluded, he acted "inadvertently and without authoriza-
tion," and this misstep "should not entitle the adverse party to take
the horse, the dog, the hamsters, and the goldfish too.""
Even the meaning of "reasonable steps" in the other setting-
what the disclosing party should do after making its mistake-can
be a challenge to sort out. The clawback provision in CRCP
26(b)(5)(B) contains 14-day time limitations that are not in the
federal counterpart. It provides that when faced with a request to
return documents, the receiving party has 14 days to object to the
claim of privilege or work product, and the producing party then
has 14 days to "put up or shut up"-to defend its privilege or work
product claim or to abandon it.
Neither the state nor the federal rule restricts the time during
which the producing party may seek return of the material,
although delay in trying to correct an inadvertent production when
the producing party learns of problems can have a negative impact
on claims of privilege or work product. On this point, the federal
Advisory Committee Note to FRE 502 offers the comment that
there is no obligation to "engage in a post-production review,"
although the producing party must "follow up on any obvious indi-
cations" of mistaken production.19 A moment's reflection suggests
the wisdom of the Advisory Committee on this point: If the pro-
ducing party has to keep covering its own tracks, for example by
reviewing documents after producing them, the intended benefit
of a flexible waiver doctrine would be lost. Yet it also appears to be
correct that further delays could be unfair to the receiving party if
the producing party procrastinates when it has been put on notice
that it may have inadvertently produced privileged material or
work product.
Whether reasonable steps were taken to guard against disclo-
sure and to retrieve privileged or work product materials produced
inadvertently is a matter of discretion for the trial court. As a prac-
tical matter, such decisions are nearly unreviewable, not only be-
cause the trial court enjoys broad discretion, but also because such
orders are interlocutory in nature (hence usually not subject to
immediate appeal) and the question to be answered depends on
the individual facts of the case. It is a slightly different matter when
a Colorado magistrate or a federal magistrate judge makes such de-
cisions and a dissatisfied party may seek immediate review of pre-
trial orders by the presiding trial judge.20
Agreements and Court Orders
Planning can help avoid the kind of questions Rhoads addressed.
Parties can enter into agreements and courts can enter orders that
govern in some detail the steps to be taken in culling privileged and
work product material from documents turned over in discovery.
Through agreements, parties can define, for example, "due care"
that excuses inadvertent production and lets the producing party
"put the cat back in the bag." Moreover, every litigator in this state
should consider seeking a Rule 502 order in every civil action. As
one federal judicial officer famously pronounced,"it is malpractice
to not seek a 502(d) order from the court before you seek docu-
ments."21
Parties can also agree on the use of specific litigation consultants
or computer programs that conduct searches with minimal human
involvement, or on the use of search protocols to be followed by
lawyers, paralegals, or technicians.2 2 It seems probable that the par-
ties can even agree on taking no precautionary measures to cull
privileged or work product material from what is produced. The
Advisory Committee Note to FRE 502 contemplates that a court
order can endorse such arrangements, and courts are often prepared
to honor private agreements taking this approach.23 Under this
arrangement, the producing party turns over all material responsive
to the production request, the receiving party takes a "quick peek" at
this material and designates the documents it wants to use, and the
producing party can then claim or forego privilege or work prod-
uct protection. This practice has enjoyed growing acceptance in
federal courts.24 There does not, however, seem to be a reported
Colorado decision dealing with this arrangement, and the same is
true in many other states.2 And some modern decisions hold that
even "quick peek' agreements do not protect a party who is "reck-
less" in disclosing material for which it later claims a privilege.26
Courts and parties dont always see eye to eye on the value of this
approach. In Rajala v. McGuire Woods, LLP, 27 for example, a fed-
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eral court put in place a "quick peek'arrangement at the request of
the producing party-a law firm being sued by a trustee in bank-
ruptcy for alleged violations of securities law. The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that going forward in this manner would im-
properly shift to the plaintiff the work of doing the defendant's
privilege review. The court found that FRE 502 authorizes this
approach, and stressed that the suit involved a huge number of
email messages among "thousands of clients," with high risk of in-
advertent disclosure of privileged or work product material. But
another federal court, in Good v. American Water Works Co.,29 de-
clined the request of the information-seeking plaintiff for such an
arrangement. In Good, the defendants wanted "the opportunity to
conduct some level of human due diligence prior to disclosing vast
amounts of information." Stressing that FRE 502 does not pro-
hibit this "cautious approach"and that defendants "appear ready to
move expeditiously," the court agreed with their request, with the
"expectation that the defendants will marshal the resources neces-
sary" to minimize delay.30
The lesson to be drawn from McGuire Woods and Good is not
that the decisions conflict on the propriety of"quick peek'arrange-
ments (although one allowed it and the other didn't), nor that
courts side with the producing party (although the producing party
won in both cases). Rather, the lesson is that such arrangements
can appear advantageous to either side. Sometimes the producing
party wants it, and sometimes the information seeker (the receiving
party) wants it, and courts have leeway to approve different
approaches in different situations.
Court orders on such points are important for two reasons. First,
FRE 502(e) provides that an order controls waiver of privilege or
work product protection not only among the parties and in the
action in which the order was entered, but as against third parties
and in other actions. Litigants can enter into an agreement hat is
enforceable among themselves, and FRE 502(e) recognizes this
point obliquely by saying such an agreement "is binding only on
the parties." Such an agreement does not, however, bind third par-
ties who are not signatories, and there is no assurance that a court
in another action will honor it. FRE 502(d) states, however, that if
an agreement is "incorporated into a court order," then waiver by
disclosure is governed by that order in "any other state or federal"
proceeding.
A second reason why court orders are important in litigation is
that if litigants cannot agree on an approach to waiver of privilege or
work product during discovery, as happened in McGuire Woods and
Good, a court can resolve the matter for them, regardless whether
the parties agree.
Colorado Court Orders Enforceable Elsewhere
As noted above, CRE 502(d) provides that a court order
addressing the effect of inadvertent disclosure on attorney-client
privilege or work product protection is enforceable in actions in
federal court or the courts of other states.
Lurking behind CRE 502(d), as it relates to enforcement of
Colorado court orders in other jurisdictions, are serious issues of
federalism. To begin with, there is the question how a Colorado
rule can determine the effect of a Colorado court order in, for ex-
ample, a Kansas court or a federal court. First, if the recognition
jurisdiction (the state of Kansas or a federal court) has its own Rule
502, recognition is likely and the problem should be solved.31 (In
fact, Kansas has adopted its own Rule 502, and of course, FRE 502
applies in the federal system.) Second, if the court in the jurisdic-
tion where a party seeks recognition of an order does not itself have
the substantial equivalent of Rule 502, ordinary notions of full faith
and credit and comity are likely to solve the problem.These princi-
ples normally call for the court in which recognition is sought of
an order entered by a court in another jurisdiction to apply the
preclusion law of the latter jurisdiction (the law of the jurisdiction
where the court entered the order.)3 2 In Colorado, CRE 502 states
the law, so a court in another state asked to recognize a Colorado
court order relating to the preservation of attorney-client privilege
or work product during discovery in a Colorado action should
respect and apply CRE 502, giving the same effect, in that juris-
diction, that a Colorado court would give to the Colorado order.
Effects in Colorado Courts of
Disclosures in Other Courts
As noted above, CRE 502 has the effect of directing Colorado
courts to find against waiver on account of disclosure in a suit in
another state or the federal system if such disclosure would not
have that effect in that forum.The rule expressly refers only to dis-
closure in such forum if there is no court order, and silently
assumes that a Colorado court would reach the same conclusion
when there is a court order. It seems appropriate for Colorado to
have such a rule because a Colorado court must resolve issues of
waiver on account of disclosure in a distant forum by applying
some choice-of-law principle, and in effect CRE 502 sets forth
such a principle: In this situation, it directs Colorado courts to fol-
22 The Colorado Lawyer | October 2016 | Vol. 45, No. 10
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low the law of the jurisdiction where the disclosure occurred. This
provision also has the effect of offering reciprocity to other systems
that have a rule similar to CRE 502.
Conclusion
CRE 502 seeks to modernize principles of waiver by disclosure
as it relates to attorney-client privilege and work product protec-
tion.The new provision, which is substantially identical to FRE 502
and is now the law in 14 other states, is one of considerable subtlety,
as described above. It has yet o be construed in reported Colorado
decisions, but is consistent with the approach signaled for Colorado
in the Floyd case. And the new provision should have a positive
impact in adapting Colorado law to new litigation realities.
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